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Report from the States

The prospect of open
deliberations in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court
Recent episodes have underscored a lack of collegiality
among the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
including most prominently an alleged assault of one
justice by another. In response, Chief Justice Shirley
Abrahamson proposed a menu of institutional reforms
for her colleagues’ consideration, with the stated goal
of enhancing collegiality. She expressly called on each
justice’s commitment “to promoting civility and safety
in our workplace; to maintaining personal control in
our language, demeanor, temperament, and conduct
on and off the bench; to bolstering the public trust and
confidence in the Court and our judicial system; and
to upholding the Court’s long-standing reputation for
excellence.”
The chief justice’s proposals included the issuance of
a joint statement pledging greater efforts toward collegiality, the hiring of experts on conflict resolution and
small group dynamics, and a number of modifications to
the standards and mechanisms related to recusals. But
the one that received the most attention was her suggestion that the court open its deliberations to the public.
There are, of course, many ways in which a court
might make its deliberations open, and Chief Justice
Abrahamson presented a number of options, including
holding the court’s deliberations in a room open to the
public, holding the deliberations in a closed room but
streaming live video, or recording the court’s deliberations for later release. As most observers expected, the
other justices rejected these proposals. Justice David
Prosser suggested that open deliberations would “stifle
candor.” In similar fashion, Justice N. Patrick Crooks
alluded to the clichéd parallel between the making of
law and sausage.
While open deliberation will not become a reality
at the court, Chief Justice Abrahamson’s proposal
prompts deeper consideration of precisely why closed
judicial deliberation is the uniform practice in American
appellate courts. After all, courts in some countries do
deliberate in public. The Supreme Court of Brazil, for
example, holds its deliberations in public and on live
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television, and publishes transcripts of the deliberations
together with its rulings. (The court also has its own
Twitter feed and YouTube channel.) Closer to home, at
least in terms of our systemic heritage, English courts
have long operated according to a tradition of orality in
which every step of the adjudicative process takes place
in public. The underlying idea, according to Professor
Robert Martineau, is that “[t]he faithful observance of
the tradition … guarantees the accountability of English
justice and maintains public confidence in it.”
The sense that open deliberations would be problematic seems to rest primarily on the understanding that
there is something valuable about secret deliberations
that would be lost if the process were opened. The fear
is that justices—perhaps especially those in an elective system—would be wary of articulating positions,
even tentatively, that might be used against them in a
later campaign. While egregious acts of non-collegiality
would undoubtedly be deterred, collegiality in a deeper
sense might suffer. Whatever legitimate exchanges of
ideas take place among the justices would be pushed
underground, and would not occur among the whole
court.
We might reasonably be skeptical about this reaction,
however, given that the available evidence suggests that
judicial deliberation is rarely meaningful, even on courts
that do not suffer from the collegiality issues currently
present on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Biographies
of U.S. Supreme Court justices, for example, consistently relate new justices’ disappointment at what takes
place (or, more accurately, does not) in the conference
room. Judge Posner makes the point more forcefully
in the early pages of How Judges Think: “The difficulty
outsiders have in understanding judicial behavior is due
partly to the fact that judges deliberate in secret, though
it would be more accurate to say that the fact that they
do not deliberate (by which I mean deliberate collectively) very much is the real secret. Judicial deliberation
is overrated.”
The real reason for concern, then, may not be so
much that open deliberation would lead to the loss of
something valuable, but rather that it would introduce
new pathologies. It is fascinating to ponder: what would
happen if the Wisconsin Supreme Court, or any American appellate court, held its deliberations in public? The
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result might actually be more, rather than less, dialogue,
though whether it would be worthy of the name “deliberation” is another matter. A justice may feel compelled
to limit his contribution to a prepared statement, rather
than to engage in a free-flowing, substantive debate.
At the same time, public deliberation would better
enable interest groups to monitor behavior, creating
the very real potential for reduced independence and a
decreased willingness to back off positions once taken.
Advocates might also pay close attention, and could
seek to use statements from deliberations as tools of
argumentation, suggesting that they somehow shed
light on the “true” meaning of an opinion. Courts
would, in turn, have to grapple with whether to allow
such arguments, which would raise many of the same
general issues as were featured in debates over the
precedential value of unpublished opinions. While it
would strike many as inappropriate to bar advocates
from citing statements made in open deliberation,

allowing such citation would arguably create incentives
for judges to behave strategically by attempting to stack
the deliberative record with statements favoring their
preferred perspective.
One might conclude that these effects are real but
worthwhile. Open deliberations would certainly provide
the interested public with a window into a process that
has been off limits, and what it saw through that window
might enhance its faith in the rule of law. The examples
of Brazil and England suggest that the consequences
of open deliberations are not inevitably bad, though
context matters, and both legal systems are quite different from our own. Wisconsin may not have provided
us with an opportunity to test our intuitions, but it has
given us a chance to reconsider a feature of our system
that we would otherwise take for granted.
Chad Oldfather,
Professor of Law
Marquette University Law School
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